Belief & society

Making Ranking Theory Useful for the Social World

Authors

Miguel Antonio Fonseca Martínez
Universidad La Gran Colombia
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4398-7346

Keywords:

Social research, Theory of knowledge, Sociology of knowledge, Social philosophy, Ranking Theory

Synopsis

Belief & Society: Making Ranking Theory Useful for the Social is a critical and constructive inquiry on Wolfgang Spohn's Ranking theory and its philosophical applications in social epistemology.

Miguel Fonseca introduces a new way of methodological research in social sciences and a new way to understand the deep ontology of society and human relations. This novel account shows the relevance of ranking theory as a helpful theory of rationality, and it clarifies how it can be applied to the social wordl. Therefore, the book highlights certain foundational and methodological aspects of social sciencis and their importance.

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Author Biography

Miguel Antonio Fonseca Martínez, Universidad La Gran Colombia

Licenciado en Filosofía y Lengua Castellana, magíster en Filosofía Latinoamericana y doctor en Filosofía por la Universidad Santo Tomás, con experiencia en cargos de gestión universitaria. DAAD Alumni. Profesor investigador y líder del grupo de investigación Educación y Pedagogía de la Facultad de Ciencias de la Educación de la Universidad La Gran Colombia.

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Título: Belief & Society. Autor: Miguel Fonseca Martínez

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November 12, 2023

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978-628-7626-11-9

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Fonseca Martínez, M. A. (2023). Belief & society: Making Ranking Theory Useful for the Social World. Editorial Universidad La Gran Colombia. https://doi.org/10.18634/978-628-7626-11-9